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Housing	is	of	fundamental	importance	in	securing	shelter,	security,	community	and	societal	
development	and	human	dignity	(Drudy	and	Punch,	2005).	It	is	‘a	basic	human	and	social	
requirement’	and	‘good	housing	anchors	strong	communities,	a	performing	economy	and	an	
environment	of	quality’	(Department	of	Housing	2016:	7).	Housing	also	played	a	major	role	
in	the	global	financial	crash,	and	Ireland’s	recession	with	the	‘over-stimulation	of	the	housing	
market’	accepted	as	‘a	key	causal	factor	in	the	scale	of	the	economic	downturn’	(Government	of	
Ireland,	2011).	
Inequalities	have	been	a	marked	characteristic	of	the	Irish	housing	system	both	historically	and	
in	more	recent	decades	particularly	from	the	1980s	onwards.	Some	key	features	of	the	system	
have	been:	the	disadvantaged	areas	that	suffered	disproportionally	from	unemployment	and	a	
lack	of	state	investment;	the	growing	housing	unaffordability	in	the	Celtic	Tiger	period;	and	the	
exclusion	of	those	with	disabilities	and	members	of	the	Travelling	Community	(Bissett	2008;	
Hearne	2011;	Drudy	and	Punch	2005).	However,	the	crisis,	austerity1	and	recovery	period	(from	
2008	to	2017)	have	seen	inequalities	within	the	Irish	housing	system	expand	beyond	anything	
seen	since	the	foundation	of	the	state.	
A home or a wealth generator? 
Inequality, financialisation and 
the Irish housing crisis 
Housing is the basis of stability and security for an individual 
or family. The centre of our social, emotional and sometimes 
economic lives, a home should be a sanctuary; a place to live in 
peace, security and dignity… Housing has been financialised: valued 
as a commodity rather than a human dwelling, it has become, 
for investors, a means to secure and accumulate wealth rather 
than a place to live in dignity, to raise a family and thrive within 
a community… Deprivations of the right to adequate housing are 
not just programme failures or policy challenges but human rights 
violations of the highest order, depriving those affected of the most 
basic human right to dignity, security and life itself.  
UN	Rapporteur	for	the	Right	to	Housing	2017	
1 Austerity refers to the series of budgetary measures implemented by the Irish Government between 2008 and 2014 in response to the 
economic crisis and to bail out of financial institutions which involved cumulative cuts to public spending, social welfare and raising of taxes 
of over €30bn (over 20% of Ireland’s GDP).  
Rory Hearne
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This	chapter	provides	detailed	evidence	of	how	the	current	housing	crisis	and	government	policy	
is	worsening	economic	and	generational	inequalities,	along	with	a	political	economy	analysis	
of	the	causes	of	the	housing	crisis,	and	some	potential	solutions	to	address	the	contemporary	
housing	challenge	and	inequality	in	Ireland.
Section	3.1	details	the	recent	trends	and	data	to	provide	an	overview	of	the	extent	of	the	
population	affected	by	the	housing	crisis,	in	terms	of	the	housing	cost	overburden	rate,	
homelessness,	housing	waiting	lists,	and	households	in	severe	housing	distress,	and	how	it	
affects	different	housing	sectors.
Section	3.2	briefly	introduces	the	macro-level	changes	in	state	housing	policy	from	the	
Keynesian	period	(1940s	to	1970s)	when	states	provided	and	supported	affordable	housing	(to	
varying	degrees	in	different	countries)	for	a	large	section	of	the	population	to	the	neoliberal2 
period	from	the	1980s	to	the	current	period.	It	explains	the	processes	and	impacts	of	the	
financialisation	and	commodification	of	housing	in	this	period.	Section	3.3	looks	at	the	role	of	
Irish	government	policy	in	financialisation,	austerity	and	privatisation	in	housing	over	recent	
decades.	It	explores	the	impact	on	housing	and	inequality	of	the	response	to	the	2008	crisis	
through	policies	such	as	NAMA,	the	sale	of	loans	to	vulture	funds,	and	the	support	for	Real	
Estate	Investment	Trusts.	This	section	provides	a	critical	analysis	of	the	Government’s	housing	
plan	Rebuilding Ireland, in	particular	its	dependence	on	a	private	market	approach	and	the	
privatisation	and	marketisation	of	social	housing	through	the	private	rental	sector	and	sale	of	
public	land	through	new	forms	of	Public	Private	Partnerships.	Finally,	Section	3.4	presents	a	
human	rights	and	equality	approach	to	housing	with	potential	solutions	to	the	crisis.	
Overall,	this	chapter	demonstrates	that	the	root	cause	of	the	current	(post-2013)	housing	
crisis	in	Ireland	lies	in	policies	pursued	by	governments	over	the	last	three	decades	that	have	
privatised,	commodified	and	financialised	housing.	It	shows	that	these	policies	have	been	
intensified	since	the	2008	crash	through	the	Irish	state’s	approach	to	dealing	with	that	crash:	
on-going	marketisation	of	social	housing	in	the	private	rental	sector,	intensified	austerity	cuts	
2 Harvey (2005) describes neoliberalism as a process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Neoliberalism is about creating ‘unlimited’ market 
opportunities for the private sector within public governance, services and infrastructure through privatisation and commodification of all 
public goods and infrastructure. It is the capture of public services and assets for private investment and wealth accumulation rather than 
distribution to working and middle classes and thus acerbates inequality.
Box 3.1 Ireland’s unequal housing crisis
While there are 1,400 homeless families and 2,500 children in emergency 
accommodation across the country, an additional 5,000 people became millionaires 
in 2016. Over 77,000 households are still in mortgage arrears while the debt of the 
developers that owed billions has been written off by NAMA and the banks. In Dublin, 
there are queues of hundreds of homeless people to get food in nightly soup runs, 
queues trying to get private rental accommodation and queues of a different kind in 
higher income suburbs where families are ‘outbidding each other’ to buy homes. Six 
‘trophy’ houses on one road in Dublin 4 were sold for between €3 and €4 million each 
in 2016. Meanwhile 198,358 homes lie empty in Ireland (about 13% of total housing 
stock). In Cork, there are 269 people homeless, and 21,287 vacant units and in Dublin, 
3,247 people homeless and 35,293 vacant homes. At the same time, housing and 
property have provided a key source of wealth for Ireland’s richest. A quarter of Ireland’s 
wealthiest 100 people amassed their wealth through construction, property and 
building (Sunday Times 2017). 
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to	social	housing,	attraction	of	international	investors	and	equity	funds	into	the	Irish	housing	
market	through	the	expedited	sale	of	distressed	loans	and	assets	from	IBRC	and	NAMA,	and	
various	tax	breaks	for	Real	Estate	Investment	Trusts.	Macro	level	economic	policy	prioritised	
‘fixing’	the	banks	through	re-inflating	the	property	market	and	attracting	foreign	speculative	
investors	into	residential	property	which	pushed	up	house	prices	and	rents.	This	further	
financialised	housing	and	reduced	its	affordability	for	most	of	those	who	need	it.
These	policies	and	the	housing	crisis	have	worsened	economic	inequality	in	Ireland.	Irish	and	
global	wealthy	investors	and	equity	funds	have	made	massive	returns	from	the	increased	
housing	burden	for	low	income	households	in	Ireland,	often	affected	by	rising	rents,	
repossessions,	mortgage	arrears	and	homelessness.	There	is	an	additional	wealth	transfer	from	
the	Irish	state	to	the	wealthy	in	subsidies	for	landlords,	tax	measures,	the	sale	of	discounted	land	
and	assets	etc.	In	order	to	revive	this	sector	of	the	economy,	government	policy	thus	prioritised	
the	interests	and	requirements	of	Irish	and	international	property	investors	and	equity	funds	
over	the	housing	needs	of	large	sections	of	the	Irish	population	–	especially	those	of	the	most	
vulnerable.
The	contemporary	housing	problem	in	Ireland	is	an	extremely	complex	issue,	but	it	is	not	a	
‘natural’	disaster	or	an	accidental	policy.	It	results	from	the	specific	housing	and	the	economic	
policies	pursued	by	government	and	the	interlocking	effects	of	growing	social	inequality,	
financialisation,	and	neoliberal	policy.	And	just	as	particular	government	policies	have	created	
the	crisis	it	is	evident	that	alternative	policies,	as	demonstrated	in	countries	such	as	Denmark	
and	Austria,	can	solve	it.	Although	this	chapter	presents	a	clear	outline	of	how	privatisation,	
commodification	and	financialisation	of	housing	is	causing	the	housing	crisis	and	exacerbating	
economic	inequality,	the	chapter	also	highlights	clear	alternative	policy	choices	that	can	provide	
an	affordable	and	secure	home	to	all	the	people	of	Ireland	and	ensure	their	human	right	to	
housing	is	fulfilled.	As	well	as	other	policy	measures,	this	will	require	a	New	Deal	programme	of	
state-led	provision	of	affordable	rental	housing	through	a	new	Irish	Affordable	Homes	Company.
3.1 Crisis for whom? Housing affordability and insecurity
The	significant	level	of	affordability	stress	in	relation	to	housing	in	Ireland	is	shown	by	the	fact	
that	one-third	of	people	in	Ireland	‘worry	about	and/or	struggle	to	be	able	to	pay	their	rent	or	
mortgage	every	month’	(Focus	Ireland	2016).	One	in	every	nine	people	(12%)	are	worried	they	
will	lose	their	home	(this	is	17%	for	those	aged	25-34	indicating	the	higher	proportion	of	young	
people	affected	by	the	housing	crisis),	while	6%	of	the	population	(220,000	people)	are	worried	
about	becoming	homeless.
The private rental sector
The	housing	crisis	has	affected	those	living	in	the	private	rented	sector	most	acutely	-	from	
unaffordable	rents	to	the	lack	of	security	in	their	home.	Rising	rents	are	making	renting	as	
a	housing	choice	impossible.	Rising	rents	are	leading	to	individuals	and	families	becoming	
homeless,	being	unable	to	save	for	a	deposit,	going	back	to	live	with	family,	overcrowding,	
and	‘couch-surfing’.	For	example,	there	was	a	28%	increase	in	overcrowding	between	2011	
and	2016.	In	2016	there	were	95,013	permanent	households	with	more	persons	than	rooms,	
accommodating	close	to	10%	of	the	population	(CSO	2017).
Rents	increased	by	13.5%	on	an	annual	basis	in	the	final	quarter	of	2016;	in	Dublin	the	increase	
was	15%	(Daft.ie	2017).	Rents	in	Dublin	are	now	up	almost	65%	from	their	lowest	point	in	2010	
and	are	a	full	14%	higher	than	their	previous	peak	at	the	start	of	2008	(RTB	2017).	The	average	
rent	for	Dublin	City	Centre	is	€1,655	per	month.	In	contrast,	the	Consumer	Price	Index	showed	
no	change	in	2016,	fell	by	0.3%	in	2015	and	only	increased	by	0.2%	in	2014	and	0.5%	in	2013.	
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A	single	person	on	
average	earnings	
of	€36,000	paying	
the	average	
monthly	rent	
of	€957	for	a	1	
bed	apartment	
in	Dublin	is	
allocating	41%	of	
their	net	income	
to	the	cost	of	
renting.
The	average	weekly	rent	paid	to	private	landlords	in	April	2016	was	€199.92,	up	from	€171.19	
(16.8%)	in	2011.	The	highest	growth	in	rent	between	2011	and	2016	was	in	Dublin	City	
which	increased	by	almost	30%;	rises	in	excess	of	20%	were	also	recorded	in	Dún	Laoghaire–
Rathdown	(26.2%),	Fingal	(22.8%),	South	Dublin	(22.7%)	and	Kildare	(20.3%).	The	number	of	
households	paying	at	least	€300	per	week	rent	to	a	private	landlord	increased	by	166%	since	
2011	(CSO	2017).
A	single	person	on	average	earnings	of	€36,000	paying	the	average	monthly	rent	of	€957	for	a	
1	bed	apartment	in	Dublin	is	allocating	41%	of	their	net	income	to	the	cost	of	renting.	A	person	
on	€25,000	(above	the	median	wage	of	€23,000)	would	be	allocating	55%	of	net	income	on	
renting.
Rents	are	increasing	because	landlords	are	taking	advantage	of	a	significant	increase	in	demand.	
Fewer	than	4,000	housing	units	were	available	to	rent	across	the	country	in	February	2017,	in	
contrast	to	over	20,000	being	available	in	2010.
Chart 3.1 RTB rent index - Dublin
Source: Derived from RTB (2017: 17)
Rising	rents	have	resulted	in	a	growing	gap	between	the	rent	limits	set	for	state	housing	support	
(such	as	the	rent	allowance/rent	supplement	and	the	Housing	Assistance	Payment)	available	to	
lower	income	private	rented	tenants	and	the	actual	market	rent.	More	than	80%	of	the	homes	
available	to	rent	are	too	expensive	for	people	on	state	housing	benefits.	A	majority	of	Rent	
Supplement	clients	are	also	making	top-up	payments	to	landlords	-	which	is	likely	to	be	pushing	
already	low	income	tenants	further	into	poverty	(Simon	2016).
There	are	also	issues	relating	to	insufficient	security	of	tenure	for	tenants,	the	lack	of	
enforcement	and	penalties	for	landlords	(Sirr	2014).	Landlords	can	evict	tenants	if	they	state	
they	are	moving	a	family	member	in	or	selling	the	property,	or	the	tenant	is	unable	to	pay	
increased	rents.	This	has	been	increasingly	used	in	recent	years	as	a	way	to	evict	tenants	and	get	
in	new	ones	on	higher	rents	or	to	sell	the	property.	This	has	been	the	main	cause	of	the	rise	in	
homelessness.	
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There	were	351	complaints	from	tenants	about	illegal	evictions	by	landlords	in	2016,	up	from	
c	320	in	2015	(RTB	2017).	Tenants	are	often	unaware	of	their	rights	and	can	find	it	difficult	
to	access	the	Residential	Tenancies	Board.	The	private	rental	sector	is	therefore	a	relatively	
insecure	form	of	tenancy	(Threshold	2016).
House prices and affordability of mortgages
Chart 3.2	tracks	the	increase	in	residential	property	prices.	In	January	2017,	residential	property	
prices	at	a	national	level	increased	by	7.9%,	up	from	5.6%	in	the	previous	year.	(The	national	
index	is	31.8%	lower	than	its	highest	level	in	2007.	However,	from	the	trough	in	early	2013,	
prices	nationally	have	increased	by	49.6%	and	in	the	same	period	Dublin	residential	property	
prices	have	increased	65.2%.	House	prices	grew	in	Dublin	by	23%	in	2014,	but	then	moderated	
to	8%	in	2015	and	2016.
Chart 3.2 Percentage change over 12 months for residential property index (%) by type of 
residential property and year (%)
Source: Source: CSO StatBank/House Prices/HPM06
Chart 3.3	shows	the	share	of	people’s	income	taken	up	by	housing	costs.	In	the	first	half	of	
2016	in	Dublin	mortgage	repayments	accounted	for	33%	of	net	income.
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Chart 3.3. Regular monthly housing costs as percentage of disposable housing income 2016
Source: Reproduced from Housing Agency (2017: 33)
According	to	the	Housing	Agency,	house	prices	in	Ireland	are	moderately	unaffordable	but	
in	Dublin	they	are	seriously	unaffordable	(Housing	Agency	2017:	30).	Chart 3.4	shows	the	
proportion	of	‘annual	after-tax	income	(excluding	any	social	welfare	payments)	consumed	by	
mortgage	repayments’	for	a	two-earner	household	in	Dublin	between	2008	and	2016.	The	chart	
shows	the	decline	in	mortgage	affordability	from	2012	onwards,	with	mortgage	repayments	
taking	29.6%	of	the	household’s	income	in	2016).
Chart 3.4 Affordability index for a two-earner household with a 30-year mortgage  
2008-2016 (Dublin)
Source: Derived from Housing Agency (2017: 31)
The	Central	Bank	defines	affordable	housing	as	3½	times	your	gross	income	which	means	for	
two	people	on	the	average	wage,	this	is	about	€245,000,	and	for	two	people	on	the	median	
wage,	€189,000.	The	average	price	for	a	house	nationally	is	€242,586,	while	in	Dublin	it	was	
€394,059	or	seven	times	the	gross	income	for	a	couple,	both	on	the	median	wage.
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Inequality of affordability – the housing cost overburden rate
The	Housing	Cost	Overburden	Rate	is	defined	as	living	in	a	household	where	the	total	housing	
costs	(net	of	housing	allowances)	represent	more	than	40%	of	the	total	disposable	household	
income.	It	is	important	to	note	that	households	spending	more	than	30%	of	disposable	
household	income	on	housing	are	considered	at	risk	of	facing	an	affordability	problem	(Housing	
Agency	2017).	Therefore,	these	figures	arguably	understate	the	problem	considerably.
The	extent	to	which	housing	is	unaffordable	exacerbates	economic	inequality.	Table 3.1	shows	
how	housing	costs	have	become	unaffordable	for	different	groups	over	time.	This	is	especially	
the	case	for	income:	there	is	a	significant	difference	in	the	housing	affordability	rates	for	lower	
income	households	and	higher	income	households.	The	proportion	of	households	below	60%	
of	the	median	equivalised	income	(households	‘at	risk	of	poverty’)	affected	by	a	housing	cost	
overburden	is	nine	times	that	of	households	above	60%	of	the	median	income.	Over	the	period	
of	the	crisis	the	proportion	of	households	below	60%	of	the	median	income	affected	by	a	
housing	cost	overburden	increased	significantly	from	12%	in	2008	to	28%	in	2012	and	remains	
elevated	at	18%	(Eurostat	2017).	This	equates	to	approximately	150,000	households.
Table 3.1 Housing cost overburden: Ireland 2007-2015
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
By median income
Below 60% of median 
equivalised income
12.3 12.2 17.3 23.1 27.3 28 21 27.1 18.2
Above 60% of median 
equivalised income
1.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.3 2 1.6 2.2 2
By income quintile
1st Quintile 11.1 14.7 18.6 23.1 25 18.1 23.8 15.6
2nd Quintile 3.5 2.2 3.3 2.9 2.5 3.5 3.7 4.7
3rd Quintile 0.7 0.7 1.1 2.2 1.5 1.3 2 1.9
4th Quintile 0.6 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4
5th Quintile 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.9 1.7 0 0.9 0.8
By age group and income
Below 60% in the age  
group 25-29 years
13.6 29.4 22.1 37.8 31 47.9 25.6 53.3 34.2
Above 60% in the age group 
25-29 2.8 4.9 4.2 3 4.6 3.5 2.6 5.1 4
By household type
Single person with  
dependent children
7.6 9.6 9.3 10.3 12.8 14.9 11.4 14.2 16.2
Households without  
dependent children
4.4 3.7 4.4 5.7 7.3 7.3 6.2 8 5.1
Source: Eurostat from EU-SILC [table t_ilc_lvho_hc]
Looking	at	the	different	groups	in	the	distribution	of	income,	Table 3.1	also	shows	how	the	
housing	cost	overburden	rate	for	the	bottom	20%	of	the	population	(the	first	quintile)	is	20	
times	higher	than	that	of	top	20%	(the	fifth	quintile).	Between	2008	and	2012	the	rate	doubled	
for	the	bottom	20%,	reaching	a	high	point	in	2012,	then	again	in	2014.	The	increases	are
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much	less	clear	for	the	top	40%	of	the	population,	where	only	a	very	small	proportion	were	
overburdened	by	housing	costs	relative	to	their	income.
Housing	affordability	is	also	an	inter-generational	issue,	effecting	young	people	more	than	their	
elders.	However,	Table 3.1	shows	clearly	how	socio-economic	background	creates	differences	
between	young	people.	Young	people	on	lower	incomes	are	more	severely	affected	by	the	issue	
of	housing	affordability	than	young	people	on	higher	incomes.	In	2014,	53%	of	young	people	
aged	25	to	29	years	who	came	from	a	lower	income	(below	60%	of	median	income)	background	
were	affected	by	a	housing	cost	overburden,	but	only	5%	of	young	people	above	60%	of	the	
median	income	were	affected.
In	terms	of	household	type,	we	see	a	similar	pattern	to	trends	of	poverty	and	deprivation.	The	
same	table	shows	that	the	housing	cost	overburden	rate	among	single	parent	households	has	
doubled	since	2007.	In	2015	three	times	the	proportion	of	single	parent	households	were	
affected	by	the	housing	cost	overburden	rate	as	were	households	without	children.	Given	that	
most	single	parent	households	are	headed	by	women	this	reflects	the	gendered	impact	of	the	
crisis.
Housing	cost	overburden	is	primarily	an	issue	of	the	private	rented	sector.	In	2015	just	under	a	
fifth	(18%)	of	tenants	renting	at	market	price	were	affected	by	a	housing	cost	overburden	rate.	
This	is	over	six	times	the	rate	of	those	with	a	mortgage	or	loan	(at	2.7%)	and	five	times	the	rate	
of	those	in	subsidised	accommodation	(3.7%).3	As	Table 3.2	shows,	the	consistent	poverty	rate	
of	those	in	the	private	rental	market	is	almost	three	times	that	of	owner	occupants	and	has	
increased	consistently	in	the	last	three	years.
Table 3.2 Consistent Poverty Rate (%) by tenure status and year
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Owner-occupied 2.3 2.5 3.4 3.8 5.4 5.6 5.1 4.6
Rented at market rate 2.9 8.3 10.6 6.8 9.9 10.0 10.5 11.3
Rented at below the market  
rate or rent free
16.4 17.9 17.3 21.5 21.0 26.0 23.6 24.9
Source: CSO StatBank Table SIA18
Homelessness
Homelessness	has	increased	dramatically	in	Ireland	in	recent	years	as	a	result	of	evictions	from	
the	private	rental	sector	(as	landlords	seek	to	sell	their	property	or	get	in	higher	paying	tenants)	
and	escalating	rents.	These	factors	within	the	private	rental	sector	have	become	even	more	
influential	on	homelessness	as	a	result	of	the	reduction	in	the	direct	state	provision	of	social	
housing	and	the	increased	reliance	on	the	private	rental	sector	to	provide	social	housing.
Family	homelessness	emerged	as	a	major	issue	from	2014	onwards.	A	majority	of	these	families	
are	lone	parents	(for	example,	they	comprise	70%	of	the	families	in	emergency	accommodation).	
This	reflects	the	challenges	these	families	face	from	rising	rents,	low	incomes	and	inadequate	
social	housing	supports.	As	Table 3.3	shows,	the	number	of	people	homeless	in	Ireland	over	
doubled	from	3,226	to	7,421	between	July	2014	and	December	2016.	The	number	of	homeless	
families	in	Dublin	increased	by	289%	in	this	period	and	there	are	now	2,546	children	homeless	
nationally.
3 Source as for Table 3.1.
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Table 3.3 Households accessing local authority managed emergency accommodation July 
2014 and December 2016
July 2014 Dec 2016 Change 
Homeless Families 
Dublin     271 1,055 (LP 700)    +784 (289%)
National     585 2,129 +1,544 (264%)
Homeless Children 
Dublin     344 1,239 (LP 822)    +895 (260%)
National     749 2,546 +1,797 (240%)
Homeless Adults 
Dublin  1,551 3,310 +1,759 (113%)
National  2,477 4,875 +2,398 (97%)
Total  3,226 7,421 +4,195 (130%)
Source: Department of Housing (2014); Department of Housing (2016) 
Note: LP - lone parent
A	profile	of	homeless	families	in	September	2016	also	showed	that	there	were	a	high	number	
of	young	parents,	with	67%	under	the	age	of	36.	A	majority	(60%)	were	born	in	Ireland	and	40%	
were	migrants	(of	which	20%	were	EU	and	20%	Non-EU).	A	majority	of	these	families	were	
headed	by	lone	parents	(65%)	of	which	86%	were	women	(Focus	Ireland	2017).
In	Dublin	there	is	a	monthly	average	of	almost	700	families	living	in	commercial	hotels	and	
other	forms	of	unsuitable	temporary	and	emergency	accommodation	with	families	being	unable	
to	access	cooking	facilities	and	having	to	travel	extended	distances	in	order	to	bring	their	
children	to	their	school.	The	government	is	providing	improved	emergency	accommodation	for	
families	in	the	form	of	temporary	‘Family	Hubs’	and	‘Transition	Centres’.	However	these	do	not	
provide	adequate	and	secure	housing.	‘Emergency	accommodation’	is	becoming	a	long-term	
housing	response.	Homelessness	and	situations	of	housing	insecurity	can	have	particularly	
serious	impacts	on	children	in	terms	of	their	social	and	emotional	well-being	and	long	term	
development.
Domestic violence and homelessness
Homeless	figures	do	not	include	the	1,658	individual	women	and	2,349	children	in	emergency	
refuge	accommodation.	As	a	result	of	the	housing	crisis	women	are	staying	in	refuges	for	longer	
with	a	knock-on	effect	that	thousands	of	women	looking	for	emergency	accommodation	are	
turned	away	because	refuges	are	constantly	full	(Safe	Ireland	2016),	again	another	gendered	
dimension	to	the	housing	crisis.
Direct Provision and Travellers
Furthermore,	the	homeless	figures	do	not	include	the	4,600	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	
housed	in	inhumane	and	degrading	‘direct	provision’	centres	and	an	estimated	5,500	(18.6%)	of	
the	Traveller	population	that	are	homeless	(Pavee	Point,	2016).
71
A home or a wealth generator? Inequality, financialisation and the Irish housing crisis
Housing Waiting Lists
There	has	been	a	dramatic	increase	in	housing	need	in	recent	decades	as	represented	in	
the	increase	in	the	numbers	of	households	who	qualify	for	social	housing	support	by	a	local	
authority	(referred	to	as	social	housing	‘waiting	lists’).	Table 3.4	shows	that	in	1996	there	
were	28,000	households	on	waiting	lists,	in	2005	42,000	households	and	by	2013	90,000	
households.	Over	a	third	(35,572)	of	these	were	in	the	Dublin	region.	Dublin	City	had	the	largest	
increase	between	2013	and	2016,	with	19,811	households	in	need	of	housing,	up	from	16,171	
in	2013.	Many	have	been	on	the	waiting	list	for	an	extended	period	of	time.	Twenty-one	per	
cent	of	those	on	the	list	are	on	it	for	over	seven	years	and	just	under	half	(47%)	are	on	it	for	over	
five	years	(Housing	Agency	2017).
Table 3.4 Households on national social housing waiting lists, various years
1996 28,000
2005 42,000
2016 91,600
Source: Drudy and Punch (2005); Housing Agency (2016)
Table 3.5 Cities and counties with the largest housing waiting lists 2016
Area   2013   2016 Change (number)
Dublin City 16,171 19,811   3,640
Fingal   6,020   6,858      838
Kildare   5,454   5,572      118
South Dublin   6,217   5,562     -655
Cork City   6,440   4,440 -2,000
Cork (County)   4,804   4,241    -563
Kerry   4,112   3,897    -215
Galway City   2,471   3,322      851
Total all areas 89,872 91,600   1,728
Source: Housing Agency (2016:7)
The ongoing crisis: Mortgage arrears and repossessions
There	are	77,493	(11%)	of	mortgages	for	a	principal	dwelling	house	(PDH)	in	arrears,	54,269	of	
those	(7%	of	all	mortgages)	in	arrears	over	90	days,	and	34,500	in	arrears	over	720	days.	Almost	
a	fifth	of	buy-to-let	mortgages	(26,000)	are	in	arrears.	Rent	receivers	have	been	appointed	to	
6,023	properties	in	arrears	(Central	Bank	2017).	As	Table 3.6	shows,	there	was	a	40%	increase	
in	the	number	of	repossessions	of	PDHs	in	arrears	between	2016	and	2015	with	1,694	PDH	
homes	repossessed	in	2016,	the	highest	on	record	so	far.
In	Dublin	there	is	
a	monthly	average	
of	almost	700	
families	living	in	
commercial	hotels	
and	other	forms	
of	unsuitable	
temporary	and	
emergency	
accommodation.	
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Table 3.6 PDH repossessions
Year Repossession by lender 
2012     602
2013     766
2014  1,311
2015  1,195
2016  1,694
Total  5,568
Source: Central Bank (various years)
The	financialisation	of	the	housing	system	is	evident	from	the	transformation	of	mortgages	
into	commodities	sold	on	the	international	market.	‘Non-bank	entities’	or	vulture	funds	and	
international	financial	institutions	have	purchased	large	bundles	of	mortgages	at	a	discount	from	
Irish	financial	institutions.	These	entities	have	increased	their	holding	of	the	total	Irish	mortgage	
stock	in	just	three	years	from	just	2%	of	the	total	stock	in	2013	to	6%	in	2016	(or	8%	in	value	
terms)	and	now	own	48,562	PDH	and	BTL	(Buy-To-Let)	mortgages	(Central	Bank	2017).	There	is	
a	concern	that	such	entities	will,	as	property	prices	rise,	try	to	repossess	houses.	There	is	also	a	
severe	inequality	here:	vulture	funds	buy	the	loans	at	a	discount	of	up	to	70%,	but	the	mortgage	
holders	in	arrears	are	expected	to	pay	back	the	full	loan.
Table 3.7 Non-bank entities (vulture funds) mortgage stock and arrears
Quarter % Of total mortgage stock 
% Of total mortgage 
value
Arrears over 90 days 
(value)
2013 2 2.5 9,050 (2bn)
2016 6% (5% PDH/8% BTL) 8%
Source: Central Bank (2017)
Households with severe affordability problems
Table 3.8	below	provides	an	overview	of	households	facing	severe	housing	unaffordability	and	
insecurity.	The	total,	211,600	households,	equates	to	10%	of	all	households.	This	is	roughly	the	
same	as	the	proportion	of	the	population	who	stated	they	were	in	fear	of	losing	homes	and	as	
those	affected	by	the	housing	cost	overburden	rate	in	the	bottom	two	quintiles.	These	figures	
show	the	level	of	acute/severe	housing	affordability	and	social	housing	need	is	over	double	what	
the	housing	waiting	list	figures	suggest.	The	level	of	social	and	affordable	housing	required	is	
therefore	higher	than	current	estimated	requirements.
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Table 3.8 Households affected by severe housing unaffordability and insecurity
Household situation Households
Rent supplement (not on Housing Waiting List)   18,000
HAP   16,000
Housing Waiting List   91,600
RAS   20,000
Mortgage Arrears on PDH Over 90 days   54,269
Direct Provision      4,600
Traveller Homeless      5,000
Domestic Violence Refuge      1,658
Total 211,127
A structural shift in Ireland’s housing system: Decline in  
home-ownership rates and rise in private rental sector
Prior	to	the	financial	crash,	home-ownership	in	Ireland	stood	at	76%.	This	was	down	from	a	
high	of	81%	in	1991.	The	home-ownership	level	has	declined	even	further	from	69.7%	in	2011	
to	67.6%,	a	rate	last	seen	in	1971.	The	rate	in	rural	areas	is	82%	and	in	urban	areas	59.2%	
(CSO	2017).	The	extent	of	transformative	change	that	has	happened	in	Ireland	is	shown	by	the	
fact	that	the	decline	in	home-ownership	here	is	one	of	the	largest	in	the	EU	since	the	crash	
(Table 3.9).
Table 3.9 Population in ownership tenure status 2007 and 2014
2007 2014 Change
Ireland 78.1 68.6 -9.5
United Kingdom 73.3 64.4 -8.9
Iceland 86.4 78.2 -8.2
Estonia 86.8 81.5 -5.1
Latvia 86 80.9 -5.1
Slovenia 81.3 76.7 -4.6
Euro Area 71.4 66.9 -4.5
Denmark 67.1 63.3 -3.8
Bulgaria 87.6 84.3 -3.3
Luxembourg 74.5 72.5 -2
Austria 59.2 57.2 -2
Spain 80.6 78.8 -1.8
Greece 75.6 74 -1.6
Cyprus 74.1 72.9 -1.2
Belgium 72.9 72 -0.9
Finland 73.6 73.2 -0.4
Source: Eurostat [ilc_lvh02]
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The	decline	in	home-ownership	has	meant	a	dramatic	increase	in	the	proportion	of	households	
in	the	private	rental	sector,	doubling	from	9.9%	in	2006	(145,317)	to	18.5%	in	2011	(305,377)	
(CSO	2017).	In	2016	there	were	342,222	registered	tenancies	with	174,158	landlords	and	
705,183	occupants	in	the	private	rental	sector	(RTB	2017).	This	underlines	why	trends	and	
policies	in	the	private	rental	sector	are	so	important	–	they	have	an	impact	on	a	much	larger	
section	of	the	population	than	in	previous	decades.
These	are	very	significant	structural	shifts	within	the	Irish	housing	system.	In	Ireland	in	recent	
decades	a	core	objective	of	government	housing	and	economic	policies	has	been	to	increase	
home-ownership	rates.	The	expansion	of	the	private	rental	sector	shows	the	extent	to	which	
these	policies	have	failed.
However,	home-ownership	is	not	an	‘ideal’	tenure	as	it	can	also	lead	to	household	over-
indebtedness	and	unaffordability	as	the	housing	crash	and	mortgage	arrears	crisis	has	shown	in	
Ireland.	Yet	the	principal	alternative	to	home-ownership	in	Ireland	is	the	private	rental	sector.	
As	shown	already,	this	has	tended	to	be	insecure	and	increasingly	unaffordable.	Therefore	the	
decline	in	home-ownership	rates	and	the	associated	increase	in	private	renting	present	a	major	
challenge	for	the	Irish	housing	system	and	for	government	policy.	This	includes	rising	residential	
insecurity,	generational	and	social	class	inequalities,	an	increase	in	exploitative	landlordism	and	
ultimately,	in	the	failure	to	provide	affordable	and	secure	housing	for	increasing	numbers	of	new	
and	existing	households.
Declining home-ownership amongst younger lower income households
The	biggest	decline	in	home-ownership	levels	have	been	among	the	younger	generations	
(aged	35-44),	but	in	particular	amongst	lower	socio-economic	classes	(NESC	2014).	The	home-
ownership	rate	of	professionals	for	this	age	group	only	fell	by	9%	proportionally	between	1991	
and	2011	but	fell	by	25%	for	unskilled	backgrounds.	This	has	significant	implications	for	wealth	
inequality	and	the	welfare	state	in	terms	of	pension	and	elderly	poverty	in	the	future.	The	
inequality	in	home-ownership	has,	in	fact,	grown	between	the	classes	over	this	period	–	from	a	
gap	in	home-ownership	levels	between	unskilled	and	professionals	of	26.1%	in	1991	to	a	gap	
of	31%	in	2011.	Census	2016	shows	that	it	was	more	common	to	be	renting	than	owning	in	
Ireland	if	you	were	under	35.	That	is	an	increase	from	32	years	in	2011,	28	years	in	2006,	and	
26	years	in	1991	(CSO	2017).
Data	from	Eurostat	(2017)	shows	that	there	has	been	a	proportionally	equal	fall	in	home-
ownership	rates	between	2007	and	2014	for	those	above	60%	of	the	median	income	(falling	
from	82.9%	to	72.7%	–	proportionally	a	12.3%	decline)	and	for	those	below	60%	of	median	
income(from	55.1%	to	47.6%	–	proportionally	a	13.6%	decline).	Clearly	however,	the	fall	for	
those	below	60%	is	more	significant	as	it	brings	home-ownership	rates	in	that	category	below	
50%.	These	households	are	going	to	face	much	more	difficulties	in	covering	rent	affordability	in	
the	private	rental	sector	than	those	on	higher	incomes.
Table 3.10 Owner-occupiers amongst social classes age 35-44 years 1991 and 2011 (%)
35-44 yr olds Professionals Skilled Manual Semi-skilled Unskilled
1991 91 84.8 77.1 64.9
2011 80 71.3 63.8 49
Source: Adapted from NESC (2014)
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3.2 Housing – from social and affordable housing to   
 financialised commodity
The neoliberalisation of housing
A	fundamental	change	has	taken	place	in	countries’	approach	to	housing	over	the	last	three	
decades.	From	after	the	First	World	War	up	to	the	1970s	(referred	to	as	the	Keynesian	period)	
the	state	played	a	central	role	in	Western	Europe.	The	state	directly	provided	large	numbers	
of	decent	quality	and	affordable	houses	through	the	facilitation	of	low	cost	mortgage	lending	
and	the	construction	of	social	housing.	Affordable	and	social	housing	were	part	of	the	‘social	
contract’	achieved,	in	the	main,	by	trade	unions	and	Left	political	parties.	The	philosophy	
underpinning	the	approach	to	housing	in	many	countries	during	this	period	was	that	it	should	be	
delivered	according	to	social	need	and	as	a	social	right	(Box 3.2)	through	relatively	non-market	
(de-commodified)	approaches	(Drudy	and	Punch,	2005;	Madden	and	Marcuse	2016).	While	
Ireland	signed	up	to	various	international	conventions	on	the	right	to	housing,	it	largely	failed	to	
implement	this	human	right	in	practice.
A	dramatic	shift	took	place	from	the	1980s	onwards	in	the	neoliberal4	period	(Aalbers	2016).	
States	facilitated	the	private	property	market	(see	Box 3.3)	with	a	particular	ideological	
support	for	home-ownership	as	part	of	creating	a	market	dominated	economy	and	society	
(Kemeny	1981).	Housing	was	commodified	(Madden	and	Marcuse	2016)	and	social	housing	
Box 3.2 Non-market and human rights approach to housing
 > Housing treated primarily as a home as a basic necessity– as shelter, a place to stay, 
to feel secure, to build a base, find an identity, participate in community and society
 > Housing as a social good - as a fundamental social requirement like education or 
public health
 > Priority is providing households with access to both decent and affordable housing
 > Use values (Home, shelter, security, community, neighbourhood) prioritised
 > Housing system is de-commodified (aims to shield/protect households from the 
market)
 > Housing as a human and social right for shelter (in the Constitutions and 
legislation): Article 25 of the UN Universal Declaration 1948: ‘Everyone has the right 
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself (herself) and his 
(her) family, including food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services’.
‘Adequate housing’ must be affordable, habitable and accessible to disadvantaged 
groups. It should include security of tenure, availability of services, materials, facilities 
and infrastructure. Its location must allow access to employment, health care, schools, 
child care centres and other social facilities (United Nations 1991)
Source: Drudy and Punch (2005)
4 There has been a strong and widespread global trend towards neoliberal policies since the 1980s including increased ‘free markets’, 
competition, deregulation of markets such as financial markets, opening up to international capital flows, and a smaller role for the state, 
achieved through privatisation and limits on the ability of governments to run fiscal deficits (IMF 2016).
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was	privatised	and	marketised	(Hearne	2011).	The	financialisation	of	housing	has	further	
commodified	housing.	Through	the	deregulation	of	financial	and	mortgage	markets	housing	
has	become	a	liquid	financial	commodity.	Madden	and	Marcuse	(2016:	31)	explain	housing	
financialisation	as	a	process	whereby:	‘Managers,	bankers	and	rentiers	produce	profits	from	
real	estate	through	buying,	financing,	selling,	owning,	and	speculating’.	Financialisation	has	
involved	the	expansion	of	credit	for	mortgaged	home-ownership	and	the	investment	purchase	
of	housing	to	‘flip’	or	rent	under	the	discourse	of	the	asset-based	welfare	state	(Dewilde	and	De	
Decker	2016).	New	financial	products	were	created	such	as	mortgage	securitisation	involving	
the	bundling	of	less	risky	and	risky	mortgages	into	more	profitable	investment	products	traded	
on	financial	markets.	This	shift	was	important	in	Ireland	in	the	context	of	an	inadequate	welfare	
state.	Those	who	can	afford	to	buy	a	house	seek	to	use	it	to	compensate	for	the	deficiencies	of	
pensions,	healthcare	and	elderly	care.
In	Ireland,	neoliberal	policies	included	the	withdrawal	of	local	authorities’	ability	to	borrow	for	
building	social	housing	and	reduced	role	in	issuing	mortgages	in	1987	(Box 3.4).	In	1975,	local	
authorities	provided	almost	8,800	public	‘non-market	homes	for	rent,	representing	one-third	
of	total	housing	provision	while	this	reduced	to	just	6%	of	housing	provided	in	2006.	In	1961	
18.4%	of	housing	stock	was	social	housing	but	this	reduced	to	12.5%	in	1981	and	just	8.7%	in	
2011	(143,	975	houses)	(Byrne	and	Norris	2017;	Norris	2016).
Box 3.3 Market/neoliberal/financialised approach to housing
 > Housing primarily viewed as a market commodity (like cars, televisions etc.) rather 
than a home responding to housing need
 > Housing valued primarily for its exchange value – as an asset rather than a home – 
capital appreciation, return on investment, rental income, wealth generation
 > ‘The market’ is principal provider of housing not the state or government
 > Households and individuals access housing through the market (depends on ability 
to pay (and borrow) rather than need
 > Encourages investment and speculation in housing and land
Source: Drudy and Punch (2005)
Low	and	middle	
income	households	
loose	access	to	
affordable	housing	as	
wealth	is	transferred	
from	the	majority	of	
citizens	to	the	wealthy
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Box 3.4 Social housing in Ireland: from direct state provision to 
privatisation and marketisation
1930s-1970s Large direct role of state in 
delivery of social housing, and 
state support for affordable 
home-ownership
18% of total housing stock is 
social housing
1980s Tenant purchase and ‘surrender’ 
grant, 1987 removal of local 
authorities’ ability to borrow and 
build
12.7% of housing stock is social 
housing in 1981
1990s/2000s Shift to reliance on private 
rental (rent supplement), Part V, 
acquisition, PPP
6.9% of housing stock is social 
housing 2002
Households in receipt of rent 
supplement increase from 28,800 
in 1994 to 59,976 in 2003
2008-present Austerity and marketisation 
radically reduce direct social 
housing build, reliance on private 
rental for social housing increases 
further – a third of tenants in 
private rental sector receive state 
support
8% of housing stock is local 
authority housing in 2011
Social housing capital funding cut 
by 88% between 2008 and 2014
Numbers in rent supplement 
96,803 in 2011, 85,735 in 2016 
(Rent Supplement, HAP, RAS)
Financialisation and inequality
The	financialisation	of	housing	has	also	involved	a	broader	restructuring	of	the	finance-real	
estate	relationship	through	the	increased	role	of	large-scale	corporate	finance	and	global	private	
equity	funds	purchasing	and	investing	in	residential	property	and	land	(Madden	and	Marcuse	
2016).
Financialisation,	privatisation	and	marketisation	have	opened	up	housing	and	real	estate	as	a	
key	sector	for	wealth	accumulation	for	the	growing	‘wall	of	money’	(pension	funds,	hedge	funds,	
wealth	funds)	searching	for	higher	returns	in	a	context	of	reduced	profitability	and	rising	risk	in	
the	wider	‘real’	economy	(Dewilde	and	De	Decker	2016;	Fernandez	et	al	2015;	Rolnik	2013).	
Housing	systems	have	thus	played	a	key	role	in	the	growing	wealth	of	the	‘1%’	and	the	re-
emergence	of	‘rentier	capital’	–	that	is	income	drawn	from	owning	financial	assets,	rather	than	
working	or	from	owning	productive	assets	(McCabe	2011;	Piketty	2014).
There	has	been	an	increase	in	profits	for	investors	extracted	from	the	housing	system,	
thus	increasing	the	capital	share.	As	a	result	the	housing	costs	of	workers	and	ower	and	
middle	income	households	have	simultaneously	risen,	thus	reducing	the	labour	share.	The	
financialisation	of	housing	thus	results	in	a	form	of	‘accumulation	through	dispossession’.	 
Low	and	middle	income	households	loose	access	to	affordable	housing	as	wealth	is	transferred	
from	the	majority	of	citizens	to	the	wealthy	(Harvey	2005;	Stockhammer	2004).
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Post-crisis financialisation – private rental as global commodity
In	the	post-crisis	period	housing	financialisation	has	taken	new	forms	in	Ireland	with	global	
institutional	investors	such	as	private	equity	funds	buying	billions	of	distressed	assets	and	loans	
and	increasingly,	through	securitisation	and	direct	purchase,	investing	in	the	private	rental	‘build-
to-rent’	sector	(Aalbers	2016;	Dewilde	and	Ronald	2017).	Despite	the	role	of	financialisation	in	
the	2008	crash,	we	are	seeing	an	increase	in	the	role	and	power	of	corporate	finance	in	national	
housing	systems.	Cushman	and	Wakefield’s	annual	The Great Wall of Money	report	(2017)	
showed	that	in	2015	total	trans-border	real	estate	investments	were	a	record	$443	billion	with	
investors	‘particularly	attracted	to	the	supply/demand	imbalance	driven	by	population	growth	
in	many	residential	markets	across	European	capital	cities’.	The	‘build-to-rent’	sector	is	seen	as	a	
‘compelling	opportunity	because	of	the	limitless	demand’	and	in	Dublin	it	is	viewed	as	‘a	home	
run’	(PWC	2017).	Real	Estate	Investment	Trusts	(REITs)	are	playing	a	key	role	in	opening	up	
such	housing	as	an	investment	asset	for	global	capital	(PWC	2017).	The	growth	of	REITs	is	one	
measure	of	the	financialisation	of	housing	in	a	country	such	as	Ireland	(Madden	and	Marcuse	
2016).
While	governments	encourage	such	investment	to	increase	the	housing	stock	available	for	
private	renting,	this	type	of	rental	is	usually	aimed	at	the	higher	income	end	of	the	market	e.g.	
young	professionals.	Such	trends	tend	to	reduce	the	supply	of	affordable,	low-quality	housing	
at	the	bottom	of	the	housing	ladder,	and/or	negatively	affect	security	of	tenure,	housing	quality	
and	segregation	(Dewilde	and	De	Decker	2016).
3.3 Government policy: financialisation, austerity and   
 privatisation of housing
Financialisation as a strategy for economic recovery: selling off Ireland’s 
land and homes – NAMA, the vultures and REITs
The	Irish	state’s	strategy	to	overcome	the	property	and	financial	crash	and	achieve	economic	
recovery	was	(and	still	is)	based	upon	a	recovery	in	the	property	market	which	policies	were	
designed	to	achieve.	This	was	undertaken	through	a	deepening	of	the	financialisation	of	the	
Irish	housing	(and	wider	property)	system.	It	required	two	parts	of	the	one	process;	firstly,	a	
re-inflation	of	Irish	property	prices,	and	secondly,	the	attraction	of	the	‘Wall’	of	private	equity	
and	vulture	funds	to	buy	up	the	toxic	loans	and	assets	from	Nama,	from	the	liquidators	of	the	
Irish	Bank	Resolution	Corporation	(IBRC)	and	from	the	Irish	banks.	After	2013	the	rationale	
of	increasing	‘supply’	in	the	context	of	the	housing	crisis	was	added	as	a	justification	of	this	
approach.	NAMA	played	a	central	role	in	implementing	this	state	policy	of	re-igniting	the	
Irish	property	market	through	selling	off	toxic	loans	and	assets	at	a	considerable	discount	to	
international	vulture	and	property	investors	(Box 3.5).	Through	2013	and	2014,	as	the	property	
market	picked	up,	NAMA’s	strategy	was	‘to	increase	significantly	the	flow	of	assets	to	the	market	
to	tap	into	the	increased	international	–	and	increasingly	domestic	–	investor	interest	in	Irish	
real	estate’	(NAMA	2014).	The	government	made	rental	profits	arising	in	a	REIT	exempt	from	
corporation	tax	in	2013	in	order	to	‘facilitate	the	attraction	of	foreign	investment	capital	to	the	
Irish	property	market’	(Noonan	2013).	The	state	also	attracted	the	private	equity	funds	and	
vultures	with	a	favourable	tax	regime	such	as	Section	110,	which	has	resulted	in	the	loss	of	
billions	in	taxes	to	Ireland	(Donnelly	2016).
As	a	result	of	these	policies,	vulture	funds	have	bought	up	to	90,000	properties	and	hold	at	
least	€10.3billion	worth	of	assets	in	Ireland	(RTÉ	2017).	A	single	vulture	fund,	Lone	Star,	bought	
60%	of	all	assets	sold	by	the	IBRC,	90%	of	assets	sold	by	NAMA	went	to	US	funds	(Byrne	
2015).	Box 3.5	lists	some	private	equity	investors	and	vulture	funds	now	active	in	Ireland.	The	
Irish	Real	Estate	Investment	Trust	(IRES),	set	up	in	April	2014	is	now	the	largest	private	landlord	
in	Ireland	with	2,378	apartments.	As	Table 3.11	shows,	the	total	assets	in	real	estate	funds	in	
Ireland	was	€18	billion	at	the	end	of	2016	(€12bn	of	these	assets	were	held	in	property	within	
Ireland)	up	from	€6.9bn	in	2014,	doubling	in	2015,	and	increasing	by	300%	by	2016	(Central	
Bank	2016).
79
A home or a wealth generator? Inequality, financialisation and the Irish housing crisis
Table 3.11 Assets in real estate funds held in Ireland
Year Value (€m)
2014 Q1   6,940
2014 Q2   7,790
2014 Q3   9,238
2014 Q4 10,698
2015 Q1 12,247
2015 Q2 12,884
2015 Q3 13,814
2015 Q4 14,800
2016 Q1 15,092
2016 Q2 16,756
2016 Q3 18,176
2016 Q4 18,609
Source: Central Bank (2016)
Box 3.5 A selection of private equity investors and vulture funds 
which bought property loans and assets in Ireland
Equity Fund/
Vulture
Assets purchased Selling body/
agency
Year of purchase
Lone Star At least €5bn of loans 
including 1,700 acres of 
land in Dublin
RBS
IBRC (INBS loans)
2015
2014
Kennedy Wilson Bank of Ireland shares, 
distressed loans 
Commercial and residential 
property
Bank of Ireland
Bank of Scotland
2011
2012
Hines - worth €93.2 
billion
400 acres land in 
Cherrywood
Offices
NAMA
IRES REIT Project Orange –716 
residential units
NAMA 2014
Goldman Sachs Home Mortgages
Commercial Buildings
Ulster Bank
IBRC
AIB
2014
2014
2016
Oaktree - worth €97 
billion and its subsidiary 
Mars Capital
Project Emerald and Project 
Ruby – Par Value €4.7bn
Development of €450 
million worth of offices in 
Docklands
Limerick Strand apartments 
Mortgage loans
NAMA
NAMA
IBRC
2016
2014
Blackrock- world’s largest 
asset management 
agency
Docklands commercial and 
student housing units
NAMA/CIE 2016
Source: Byrne (2015); NAMA (2016 )
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Inequalities resulting from post-crash financialisation in Ireland
Chart	3.5	shows	that	from	2013	onwards	there	was	a	significant	increase	in	the	purchase	of	
housing	in	Ireland	as	an	investment	by	non-occupying	households	(classified	as	‘Household	
Buyer	–	Non-Occupier’	and	‘Non-Household	Buyer’).
Chart 3.5 Residential dwellings sales by type of buyer and month, 2010-2017
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Source: CSO StatBank Table HPM02
As	Table	3.12	shows,	these	two	groups	of	investors	together	purchased	5,194	properties	in	
2010	(22%	of	all	purchases	in	that	year),	but	this	increased	to	16,999	properties	in	2016	(36%	
of	all	purchases).	Indeed,	in	the	first	quarter	of	2017	investor	purchases	have	amounted	to	38%	
of	all	buyers.
Table 3.12 Buyers of dwellings 2010-2017
  2010    2013   2016   2017 Q1
Household buyers
(‘Household	Buyers…	‘First	time	Buyer	Owner	
Occupier’	and	‘Former	Owner	Occupier’
18,793  24,093  34,131   8,203
Investors  
(‘Household	Buyer	–	Non	Occupier’	and	 
‘Non-Household	Buyer’)
  5,194    8,415 16,999    4,941
Total dwelling purchased 23,987  32,508 51,130 13,144
Investors as % of total      21.7      25.9      33.2      37.6
Source: CSO Statbank Table HPM02
These	purchases	add	a	significant	demand	for	housing	and	thus	are	inflating	house	prices	and	
making	them	less	affordable	for	those	seeking	housing	as	a	home.
Box 3.6	outlines	how	the	Irish	state’s	approach	to	dealing	with	the	economic	and	property	
crash	through	the	re-financialisation	of	the	Irish	housing	and	property	system	has	resulted	in	a	
massive	transfer	of	wealth	to	already	wealthy	investors,	global	equity	and	real	estate	funds.
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Box 3.6 Impact of the great Irish sell-off: inequalities resulting 
from post-crash financialisation in Ireland
 > Transfer of wealth to the already wealthy Irish and global 1% e.g. of the top 5 Irish 
billionaires listed in Forbes, one is John Grayken owner of Lone Star
 > Encouragement of housing as an investment – increasing house prices
 > Encouragement of investment in commercial property rather than housing e.g. 
NAMA, REITs. Financialising housing and land according to its highest ‘exchange’ 
value rather than prioritising its most needed social ‘use’ value (i.e. for affordable 
housing).
 > Facilitated land hoarding - waiting for (and contributing to) house prices to rise - 
NAMA sold development land (sites) to investors that had the potential for up to 
20,000 housing units but just 1,100 (5%) of these have been built or are under 
construction. 
 > Worsening housing affordability - raised rents and house prices 
 > Eviction of tenants and home-owners in arrears
 > Mortgage loans and assets being sold at discount (of up to 60% to 70%) to investors 
- while those in mortgage arrears being forced to pay full debt back to banks or new 
owners of debt (e.g. vulture funds)
 > Increased cost to the Irish tax payer through increased rental subsidies required in 
private rental sector (involves massive transfer of wealth to private landlords) 
 > Increasing the power and influence of private equity investors over housing and 
economic policy e.g. in 2015 and 2016 intense lobbying by global funds and real 
estate investors over potential rent regulation and tax changes 
 > Housing crisis as profit opportunity for wealthy property funds; IRES REIT note 
that the ‘deep imbalance between demand and supply in Dublin’s housing market’ 
means their profit outlook is ‘very positive’
Austerity and marketisation in social housing
Chart 3.6	shows	the	annual	volume	of	social	housing	built	in	Ireland	since	1970.	It	shows	the	
dramatic	decline	in	new	social	housing	since	the	mid-1980s.	Furthermore,	despite	the	new	role	
of	voluntary	and	co-operative	schemes	in	social	housing,	they	have	been	utterly	unable	to	make	
up	for	the	fall	in	local	authority	building.
Chart 3.6 Social housing completions by sector, 1970-2014
Source: Department of Environment, Local Authority Scheme Statistics 2016
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The	Department	of	Environment	suffered	the	second	highest	proportionate	budget	reductions	
of	any	Department	between	2008	and	2012	reflecting	a	neoliberal	bias	against	social	housing	
investment.	From	2011	to	2015	Ireland	had	the	lowest	levels	of	provision	of	new	social	housing	
in	over	35	years	with	just	75	local	authority	houses	built	in	2015	(Table 3.13).	The	resultant	
lack	of	social	housing	is	a	major	factor	in	the	growing	homelessness.	This	shows	the	serious	
social	fall-out	from	austerity	policies	in	Ireland.	For	example,	in	2009,	5,373	new	social	housing	
units	were	built	(3,362	local	authority	units	and	2,011	voluntary	and	cooperative	units),	while	
in	2010	that	fell	to	2,081	new	units.	The	reduction	in	direct	build	social	housing	also	resulted	
from	policy	shifts	towards	marketising	social	housing	provision	through	an	increased	reliance	on	
delivery	through	the	private	sector,	in	particular	from	the	private	rental	sector,	coupled	with	an	
ineffective	request	to	developers	to	include	5%	of	social	housing	within	new	housing	schemes.	
Some	local	authorities	also	expressed	a	desire	to	shift	the	responsibility	for	dealing	with	the	
‘problem’	of	social	housing	provision	over	to	the	private	sector.
Table 3.13 Impact of austerity and privatisation on new social house building, 2009-2016
LA AHB Total new social build Acquisitions
Austerity and privatisation 
related reduction in supply 
(‘loss’) of social housing
2009 3,362 2,011 5,373    727           0
2010 1,328    753 2,081    850   3,292
2011    486    745 1,231    325   4,142
2012    363    653 1,016    351   4,357
2013    293     211     504    253   4,869
2014    158     357     515    183   4,858
2015       75     401     476 1,099   4,897
2016    234    418     652 1,200    4,721
Total 31,136
Source: Hearne and McMahon (2016)
Austerity	and	marketisation	in	social	housing	resulted	in	only	1,231	social	units	built	in	2011	
and	an	on-going	decline	until	2013	with	just	476	social	units	built	in	2015	(Table 3.13).	Thus,	if	
the	austerity	cuts	and	privatisation	policy	had	not	taken	place,	and	social	housing	had	continued	
to	be	built	at	the	same	scale	as	2009,	an	additional	31,136	social	housing	units	would	have	
been	built	in	the	period	2010	to	2016.	We	can	also	compare	recent	years	to	the	six-year	period	
prior	to	austerity,	2004	to	2009.	During	those	years	there	were	34,758	new	social	units	built	
(24,969	local	authority	and	9,789	housing	association).	By	contrast	in	the	period	of	austerity	
and	deepening	marketisation	of	social	housing	(2010-2015)	just	5,823	new	social	units	were	
built	-	a	reduction	of	83%	on	the	previous	pre-austerity	period.
Privatisation and marketisation of social housing: private market is now 
key supplier of social housing
In	Rebuilding Ireland	(Department	of	Housing	2016)	a	majority	(65%	or	87,000	units)	of	the	
134,000	(misleadingly	titled)	‘new’	social	housing	to	be	provided	from	2016	to	2021	is	to	be	
sourced	from	the	private	rental	sector,	and	mainly	through	the	Housing	Assistance	Payment	
(HAP)	(Chart 3.7).
Of	the	47,000	new	‘build’	local	authority	and	Housing	Association	social	housing	only	21,300	
units	will	actually	be	new	build	exclusively	for	social	housing.	Some	11,000	are	to	be	acquired	
from	the	market,	10,000	units	are	to	be	leased	from	the	market,	and	4,700	are	to	come	 
from	Part	V.
Only a fifth (1,829) 
of the 8,300 new 
social housing 
‘pipeline’ announced 
in February 2017 are 
‘on site’ already. There 
are likely to be less 
than 1,000 new builds 
in 2017 (a third of the 
projected 3,000 figure 
outlined in Rebuilding 
Ireland).
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Chart 3.7 Spectrum of social housing provision forecast, 2016-2021
Source: Department of Housing (2016: 46)
Thus	the	headline	social	housing	figures	disguise	the	reality	of	the	extremely	low	level	of	new	
build	social	housing	and	the	over-dependence	on	the	private	market	to	provide	social	housing.	
For	example,	while	it	was	stated	that	18,000	new	social	housing	‘solutions’	were	provided	in	
2016,	in	fact	there	were	just	650	actual	new	build	social	housing	units	(and	only	210	of	these	
were	built	by	local	authorities	with	just	40	in	Dublin).	This	was	far	below	the	2,200	projected	
new	builds	for	2016.	Furthermore,	Part	V	delivered	just	37	social	housing	units	in	2016	(down	
from	64	in	2015).
Table 3.14 ‘New’ social housing supply/social housing ‘solutions’ 2016
National   Dublin City Council
Voids brought into use                      2,100        969
LA New housing build                          234         40
AHB New Housing Build                     418          23
Leasing        719     250
Part V                                                       37      UA
Acquisitions    1,813      155
HAP Tenancies  12,000     640
Total 17,321 2,077
Source: Hearne and McMahon (2016)
Overall,	of	the	planned	134,764	‘new’	social	housing	units,	only	21,000	(15%)	are	set	to	be	
provided	through	non-market	direct	social	housing	provision.
Low level of new social housing in the pipeline
Only	a	fifth	(1,829)	of	the	8,300	new	social	housing	‘pipeline’	announced	in	February	2017	are	
‘on	site’	already.	There	are	likely	to	be	less	than	1,000	new	builds	in	2017	(a	third	of	the	projected	
3,000	figure	outlined	in	Rebuilding Ireland).	In	Dublin	City,	there	were	only	604	social	housing	units	
started	on-site	in	2016,	just	five	in	South	Dublin	and	none	in	Cork	City.	At	this	rate	of	building,	
with	a	social	housing	waiting	list	of	almost	20,000	in	the	capital,	it	could	take	over	40	years	to	
provide	a	permanent	home	to	those	on	the	Dublin	City	Council	housing	waiting	list.	And	that	does	
not	include	people	who	become	newly	homeless	or	in	need	of	social	housing…
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
2015 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
HAP RAS Leasing Acquisition Build
84
Cherishing All Equally: Economic Inequality in Ireland
Table 3.15 Social housing projects planned in four Dublin local authority areas
Dublin City Council Dún Laoghaire
South 
Dublin Dublin Fingal Total 
Local Authority 
Units
   560 (283 Rapid build)  268  365 242  1,435
LA Units 
Regeneration
   250    250
AHB Units    745      1     21 223    990
Total 1,555  269  386 465 2,675
Completed 2016      97    54    15    48    214
Started on site 
2016    604 (173 LA, 131 LA Rapid) 156 (LA)      5 238 (106 LA) 1,003
Source: Department of Housing, 2017a
Problems with the private market approach
The	privatisation	and	marketisation	of	social	housing	provision	through	the	private	rental	sector	
has	meant	greater	housing	distress	for	lower	and	middle	income	households	and	a	rising	cost	for	
the	state.	It	has	worsened	the	wider	housing	crisis	by	increasing	demand	and	reducing	supply	
in	the	private	rental	sector.	Under	HAP,	local	authorities	are	not	responsible	for	re-housing	the	
tenant	if	an	issue	arises.	HAP	does	not	provide	tenants	with	a	permanent	home	and	security	of	
tenure	as	with	traditional	local	authority	housing.
Take	a	family	with	a	5-year	old	child,	for	example.	They	want	to	be	sure	that	in	10	years’	time,	
they	will	still	be	living	in	the	locality	where	their	child	is	going	to	school.	In	the	private	rented	
sector,	if	the	landlord	stops	paying	the	mortgage,	or	decides	to	sell	the	house,	the	family	will	be	
given	notice	to	quit.	This	is	a	significant	diminution	of	the	human	right	to	secure	housing	which	
existed	in	social	housing	provided	by	local	authorities.
Tenants	that	qualify	for	social	housing	supports	have	to	access	their	accommodation	themselves	
from	the	private	market	and	thus	are	competing	with	professionals	and	higher	income	renters.	
They	therefore	encounter	housing	disadvantage	in	terms	of	access,	affordability,	quality,	
administrative	practices,	discrimination,	and	increased	vulnerability	to	homelessness.	Through	
HAP	social	housing	is	further	marketised.	Rather	than	social	housing	protecting	lower	income	
households	from	the	inequalities	of	the	private	market,	the	new	social	housing	actually	further	
exposes	them	to	the	market.
In	2016,	there	were	50,000	tenants	in	receipt	of	rent	allowance,	16,000	HAP	recipients	and	
20,000	RAS	recipients,	at	a	cost	of	€566	million	(€29m	on	HAP,	€42m	on	SCHEP,	€136m	on	
RAS,	€300m	on	rent	allowance).	If	the	current	approach	continues	there	could	be	up	to	120,000	
tenants	in	receipt	of	various	state	subsidies	in	the	private	rental	sector	by	2021.	This	will	require	
state	spending	of	€1bn	per	annum	which	will	be	going	to	private	landlords,	including	REITs	and	
global	investment	funds.
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Rebuilding Ireland,	therefore,	is	manipulating	and	misleading	the	public	as	to	the	level	of	actual	
new	build	permanent	social	housing.	The	almost	complete	reliance	of	the	social	housing	strategy	
on	the	provision	of	housing	from	the	private	rental	and	housing	market	means	that	it	is	highly	
unlikely	to	provide	social	housing	on	the	scale	required	given	the	lack	of	supply	in	the	private	
market.	Indeed,	the	profit	motive	will	seek	to	maintain	the	shortage.	This	approach	will	worsen	
the	wider	housing	crisis	as	it	adds	significant	demand	to	those	sectors	and	therefore	pushes	up	
rents	and	house	prices.
Privatising public land through new and expanded PPP projects
Rebuilding Ireland	(Department	of	Housing	2016:	17)	also	includes	a	‘new	approach	to	housing	
provision’	through	‘mixed-tenure	housing	development	on	State	lands,	including	local	authority	
lands’.	Essentially	it	takes	the	principle	of	the	failed	Public	Private	Partnership	approach	
developed	by	Dublin	City	Council	in	the	period	of	2001-2007	(Bissett	2008;	Hearne	2011;	
Norris	and	Hearne	2016)	and	applies	it	as	the	central	strategy	for	state-supported	housing	
provision	into	the	future.	It	involves	public	land	being	handed	over	into	the	private	ownership	
of	private	developers,	with	70%	of	the	housing	being	developed	as	private	units	for	sale	or	
rent	and	only	30%	as	social	housing.	Three	sites	are	currently	being	advertised	to	developers	
by	Dublin	City	Council	and	will	involve	1,300	housing	units	(of	which	just	390	will	be	social	
housing)	on	30	hectares	of	state-owned	land.	Two	of	the	sites	housed	the	communities	of	
O’Devaney	Gardens	and	St	Michael’s	Estate	where	PPPs	collapsed	in	2008.	It	is	highly	likely	that	
the	private	investors	will	sell	or	rent	the	housing	at	prices	beyond	the	affordability	range	of	a	
majority	of	Dublin	households.	This	approach	hands	the	power	of	development	and	time-line	of	
delivery	of	housing	on	public	land	over	to	private	finance	enabling	them	to	dictate	the	pace	of	
development,	the	make-up	of	the	master	plans,	level	of	affordable	housing	provision	etc.	It	also	
entails	a	large	transfer	of	public	wealth	to	private	investors.
Part	of	the	justification	of	the	privatisation	of	public	land	is	that	it	achieves	‘a	better	mix	
between	private	and	social	housing,	rather	than	the	reliance	on	large	mono-tenure	public	
housing	projects’.	However,	a	tenure	mix	does	not	guarantee	a	social	or	income	mix.	A	social	mix	
requires	a	more	complex	policy	that	combines	the	social	provision	of	housing	with	job	creation	
and	educational	access.
The	other	justifications	include	the	lack	of	funding	to	enable	local	authorities	develop	social	
housing	on	a	wide-scale	basis	on	their	land,	and	that	providing	this	state-owned	land	at	a	lower	
cost	to	developers	will	reduce	the	cost	of	building	and	thus	make	house	building	viable	and	
increase	the	‘supply’	of	‘affordable’	housing.
A	new	State	Lands	Management	Group,	has	been	given	the	‘objective	to	identify	and	release	to	
the	market	a	tranche	of	lands	(from	the	ownership	of	other	public	bodies)	capable	of	yielding	up	
to	3,000	new	homes	in	the	first	phase,	with	sites	being	made	available	(to	developers)	at	costs	
that	can	deliver	homes	that	ordinary	people	can	buy	or	rent’	(Department	of	Housing	2016:	12).	
In	April	2017	the	government	released	a	map	of	this	land.	It	includes	700	local	authority	and	
Housing	Agency	owned	sites	(totalling	some	1,700	hectares),	and	30	sites	(200	hectares)	owned	
by	state	or	semi-state	bodies	in	the	Greater	Dublin	Area	and	other	major	urban	centres.	These	
sites	are	being	offered	to	developers	with	the	potential	for	‘up	to	50,000	new-build	homes’	
(Department	of	Housing	2017b).	In	the	same	month	property	sections	of	national	newspapers	
carried	advertisements	by	Dublin	local	authorities	of	the	lands	initiative	sites	as	‘three	new	
development	opportunities…in	prime	locations’	that	were	being	‘brought	to	the	market	by	
Dublin	City	Council	soon’.
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This	planned	sell	off	and	privatisation	on	a	mass	scale	of	state-owned	land,	including	700	
potential	local	authority	sites	is	one	of	the	most	serious	mistakes	in	the	government’s	wider	
housing	plan.	This	is	a	shameful	use	of	public	land	–	selling	it	cheaply	to	global	vulture	funds	to	
profit	from	providing	‘unaffordable’	housing.	It	should	instead	be	used	to	provide	predominantly	
state/public	social	and	cost	rental	housing	and	community	facilities.
A flawed private market theory
These	developments	are	part	of	the	government’s	macro-level	approach	within	housing	and	
economic	policy,	based	on	a	flawed	market	theory	which	has	focused	on	providing	an	array	
of	policy	measures	including	private	market	‘incentives’	and	‘demand-led’	policies	in	the	
hope	of	increasing	the	profitability	of	house	building	for	private	finance	and	developers	and	
thus	expecting	to	increase	housing	‘supply’.	In	this	vein	the	state	has	also	provided	a	€220m	
infrastructure	fund	to	make	development	‘viable’	on	already	zoned	land	(planning	permission	
exists	for	27,000	new	homes	in	Dublin,	with	zoned	and	developable	land	for	an	additional	
50,000	homes):
‘What	we	are	trying	to	do	is	to	ensure	that	the	viability	of	residential	investment	is	significantly	
improved...	The	sites	are	there	but	for	a	whole	series	of	reasons,	some	of	them	are	not	being	
moved	on...	We are starting to see an appetite for risk and investment in residential property in 
Dublin...	We	have	seen	extraordinary	increases in rent for residential properties which has changed 
that appetite... We need to make sure the incentive remains in place to ensure that money is investing 
significantly in residential property.’	(Coveney	2017).
However,	this	is	not	how	real	housing	markets	operate.	There	is	a	significant	monopoly	control	
over	major	parts	of	the	housing	system	by	private	speculative	interests	who	hold	large	amounts	
of	land,	control	over	the	building	process	and	own	large	amounts	of	buildings.	They	hoard	land	
and	allow	asset	price	appreciation	and	they	fix	prices	–	so	that	even	with	‘incentives’	they	do	
not	necessarily	build	and	increase	supply	and	the	‘supply’	they	provide	is	always	aimed	at	profit	
maximising	–	not	provision	of	affordable	housing	(Drudy	and	Punch	2005).
We	can	see	this	in	the	private	construction	industry’s	investment	‘strike’	in	Ireland	in	relation	
to	housing	finance	and	building	(and	particularly	since	2013	when	it	clearly	became	profitable/
viable	to	invest	in,	and	build,	housing).	The	private	sector	only	built	7,000	housing	units	in	2015	
(Reynolds	2017).	This	has	forced	concessions	from	government	and	importantly	increases	in	the	
price	of	land	and	houses	and	rent	increases.
An	array	of	government	policies	have	promoted	increased	property	and	rent	prices	(Box 3.7).	
Because	these	policies	provide	incentives	for	financialising	housing	as	an	investment	asset	and	
subsidise	the	property	industry,	they	have	fuelled	another	property	bubble	and	created	the	
latest	housing	crisis.
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Box 3.7 Creating the post-2013 housing crisis and bubble: Irish 
government policies that caused the crisis through financialisation 
of housing that encouraged a speculative investment approach to 
housing
 > NAMA and IBRC selling loans at discount to vultures/international investors/equity 
funds 
 > Austerity reduction in social housing (2008-2015) 
 > Capital gains tax relief to ‘incentivise the purchase of property’ (2011)
 > REIT tax break (2013)
 > Tax reliefs/loopholes to private equity investment funds in property
 > Abolition of windfall tax on sale of development land (2014)
 > Construction sector reduced VAT rate
 > Reduced development levies
 > Halving of the Part V requirement from 20% to 10% of developments (2015) 
 > Increase in tax-free threshold on inheritance from €225,000 to €280,000 (2015)
 > Reduced apartment standard guidelines (2016)
 > Delayed implementation of vacant site tax (and exemptions) (2016)
 > Guaranteed rental increase of 4% per annum and no limit on new and refurbished 
properties (2016)
 > No change to eviction of tenants for sale of private rental property or for family use 
(2013-present) 
 > State-funded infrastructure provision for private development (LIHAF) (2016) 
 > Help-to-Buy scheme (no-cost benefit analysis done) (2016) 
 > Reduction in Central Bank mortgage lending rules allowing increased lending (2016) 
 > Part-privatisation of local authority land to private developers/‘build-to-rent’ equity 
funds
Government	policy	has	focused	on	facilitating	and	subsidising	increased	rents	(and	house	
prices)	to	make	the	Irish	rental	and	housing	property	market	‘attractive’	(i.e.	hugely	profitable).	
This	is	intended	to	entice	private	developers	and	financiers	to	increase	‘supply’.	Appealing	to	
market	theory,	government	also	claims	this	will	lead	to	more	affordable	rents	and	prices.	Yet	
this	is	a	flawed	and	clearly	contradictory	approach.	Prices	and	rents	that	have	been	increased	
to	encourage	supply	are	not	going	to	be	reduced	by	investors	and	landlords	any	time	soon.	
Ultimately	there	is	no	evidence	that	increased	private	market	supply	of	housing	leads	to	reduced	
rents	and	prices.
Rising house prices increase inequality
Despite	the	broad	political	support	in	the	Irish	context	for	rising	house	prices	and	it	being	
a	central	plank	of	economic	and	housing	policy,	the	international	research	shows	that	in	an	
economy	with	unevenly	distributed	ownership	of	assets,	sharply	rising	housing	prices	exacerbate	
existing	inequalities	of	wealth	(Schwartz	and	Seabrooke	2008).	Those	in	the	higher	socio-
economic	groupings	reinforce	their	advantaged	position	through	the	operation	of	the	housing	
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market.	Home-owners	in	the	lower	occupational	classes	accumulate	less	housing	wealth	(i.e.	
have	larger	debts),	fall	out	of	this	tenure	more	often	and	own	houses	of	lower	quality.
TASC	has	shown	that	wealth	is	highly	concentrated	in	Ireland	with	72.7%	of	net	wealth	held	by	
the	top	20%	and	the	bottom	half	of	the	distribution	with	4.9%	of	wealth	(Hearne	and	McMahon	
2016).	The	Top	10%	owns	82%	of	all	land	(by	value)	and	just	10%	of	households	own	28%	of	
the	total	housing	in	the	country.	Fully	175,000	people	own	two	or	more	properties	–	covering	
552,000	properties.	A	mere	6,400	people	own	156,500	properties	which	means	that	0.004%	
of	the	population	own	8%	of	the	houses	(Revenue	2016).	Home-ownership	in	the	top	three	
deciles	is	at	or	close	to	90%	and	ownership	in	the	second	decile	just	51%.	While	for	lower	
income	groups,	such	as	lone	parents,	the	home-ownership	rate	is	26.3%,	which	is	less	than	half	
the	rate	for	couples	with	children	and	single	adults.
Thus	when	house	prices	rise,	these	property	owners	benefit	disproportionately	over	those	who	
do	not	own	property.	Because	second	homes	and	investment	properties	form	a	significant	part	
of	the	portfolios	of	wealthier	individuals,	these	portfolios	will	also	rise	in	value,	thus	further	
increasing	wealth	inequality.	For	example,	an	additional	5,000	Irish	people	became	millionaires	in	
2016	thanks	to	a	combination	of	rising	asset	and	property	values	(Knight	Frank	2017).
3.4 A human rights and equality-based approach  
 to housing
The	human	right	to	housing	as	a	home	needs	to	be	implemented.	When	our	financial	system	
was	in	peril	there	was	no	obstacle	too	large	for	the	state	to	overcome.	Now	we	face	an	
equivalent	crisis	in	housing	needs.	It	is	legitimate	to	ask	why	the	same	radical	approach	is	not	
applied	to	the	housing	crisis.
This	section	sets	out	a	framework	and	some	policy	suggestions	that	could	achieve	an	equality-	
and	human	rights-based	approach	to	housing	in	Ireland.	The	starting	point	of	such	an	equality	
and	human	rights	approach	to	housing	is	that	policy	needs	to	prioritise	the	provision	of	housing	
as	a	social	necessity	and	a	human	right	rather	than	as	a	speculative	investment	asset	and	a	
financialised	commodity.	This	means	secure	and	affordable	homes	are	prioritised	within	housing	
and	economic	policy	ahead	of	the	interests	of	the	property	industry,	Real	Estate	Investment	
Trusts	and	wealth	equity	fund	investors.
Constitutional	protection	for	‘the	right	of	private	ownership’	is	often	cited	as	a	barrier	to	
implementing	various	policies	that	would	fulfil	the	right	to	housing	for	Irish	citizens,	such	as	
strengthening	tenants’	rights	from	eviction,	or	compulsory	purchase	of	land	or	vacant	property	
as	proposed	in	the	Kenny	Report	of	the	1970s.	However,	the	Irish	Constitution	also	states	in	
Article	43.2.1	that	the	aforementioned	right	to	private	property	‘ought	to	be	regulated	by	the	
principles	of	social	justice’	and	the	State	may,	‘delimit	by	law’	these	rights	for	‘the	common	good’.	
Policies	aimed	at	using	the	large	amount	of	vacant	and	derelict	land	and	buildings	to	provide	
homes	to	address	the	crisis,	such	as	fast-tracking	and	increasing	the	vacant	site	tax,	compulsory	
leasing	orders	(CLOs)	on	vacant	property	or	a	vacant	property	tax,	could	invoke	these	aspects	
of	the	Constitution.	Similar	measures,	including	a	15%	non-resident	speculation	tax,	have	been	
introduced	recently	in	Canada	in	order	to	reduce	speculative	investment	in	property.
The	human	right	
to	housing	as	a	
home	needs	to	be	
implemented.	When	
our	financial	system	
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was	no	obstacle	too	
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Only	the	state	can	guarantee	through	its	policy	choices	a	sustainable	and	sufficient	supply	of	
affordable	housing.	To	do	this	requires	that	the	Irish	state	places	the	direct	provision	of	not-for-
profit	affordable	rental	and	co-operative	housing	at	the	core	of	its	function.	Government	could	
achieve	this	by	setting	up	a	new	semi-state,	public	Irish	Affordable	Homes	Company	(see	NERI	
2017)	that	could	directly	build	between	ten	and	thirty	thousand	affordable	rental	homes	per	
annum.	This	could	be	seen	as	part	of	a	Roosevelt-like	‘New	Deal’	to	address	the	housing	crisis	in	
Ireland.
The	Irish	Affordable	Homes	Company	could	apply	the	same	energy	and	creativity	as	was	applied	
with	the	ESB	delivering	electricity	across	Ireland.	This	could	provide	a	new	affordable	cost-
rental	housing	tenure	for	a	broad	range	of	income	groups	using	the	European	cost	rental	model	
outlined	below.	The	local	authority	and	NAMA	land	currently	being	sold	off	to	developers	and	
private	equity	investors	should	be	transferred	to	this	agency	instead	and	thus	used	to	benefit	
those	who	need	affordable	housing.	It	could	build	mixed	income	affordable	homes	for	rent	and	
support	co-operative	ownership	and	community	land	trust	ownership	models.	It	could	purchase	
and	bring	to	use	the	35,000	vacant	homes	in	the	wider	Dublin	area,	the	buy-to-lets	in	arrears	as	
well	as	derelict	sites	and	land	being	hoarded	by	vulture	funds,	NAMA	and	developers.	It	would	
provide	significant	value	for	money	as	it	would	have	lower	costs	of	finance,	reduced	land	costs	
and	less	profit-taking	than	the	private	construction	industry	model.	It	could	also	reduce	the	cost	
of	the	state	rental	subsidy	currently	going	to	private	landlords	and	recycle	some	of	it	back	into	
the	state	for	further	reinvestment	into	affordable	rental	housing.	This	would	not	remove	private	
sector	involvement	in	housing,	but	would	provide	for	a	greater	state	and	non-profit	role	within	
the	housing	system.
There	are	claims	that	the	EU	fiscal	rules	restrict	government	in	what	it	can	do	with	regard	to	
state	involvement	in	social	housing.	These	claims	ignore	the	flexibility	provided	for	in	these	same	
rules	which	are	subject	to	negotiation.	In	any	case,	the	rules	relate	to	budgetary	matters	and	not	
to	housing	policy	which	is	a	national	competence.	In	addition,	the	proposed	semi-state	vehicle	
moves	expenditure	off	the	state’s	balance	sheet	(as	with	other	semi-states).	Ireland’s	budgetary	
fiscal	space	can	also	be	increased	to	allow	more	investment	in	areas	such	as	housing	if	the	level	
of	tax	to	GDP	ratio	is	increased	towards	European	norms	(and	at	least,	not	reduced	further	as	is	
planned	with	tax	cuts	such	as	the	USC).	If	flexibility	on	EU	rules	is	required,	then	surely	the	Irish	
government	should	prioritise	the	negotiation	of	this	at	EU	level	in	order	to	ensure	investment	
in	affordable	housing	for	its	citizens.	For	example,	if	the	partial	sale	of	AIB	takes	place,	flexibility	
should	be	sought	from	the	European	Commission	for	some	of	the	money	raised	from	this	to	be	
directed	to	provide	finance	for	an	investment	in	housing	rather	than	debt	repayment	(Sweeney	
2016).
NAMA	still	has	significant	land	and	housing	(it	controls	a	quarter	of	all	residential	development	
land	in	the	Greater	Dublin	area)	and	it	plans	to	build	20,000	homes,	and	has	around	6,000	
additional	residential	units.	Furthermore,	NAMA	has	paid	off	95%	of	its	senior	debt	(€28bn	of	
€30bn)	originally	issued,	while	it	has	€2.2	billion	in	cash	reserves	(NAMA	2016).	NAMA	should	
be	directed	to	fulfil	its	social	mandate	and	to	use	its	remaining	cash	reserves,	land	and	property	
to	provide	social	and	genuinely	affordable	housing.	NAMA	should	transfer	this	land	to	local	
authorities	or	to	a	new	Irish	Affordable	Homes	Company	as	appropriate.
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Tackling	the	housing	crisis	through	a	state-funded	programme	of	construction	would	also	help	
ensure	workers	have	quality	employment.	Measures	to	do	this	could	include	public	contracts	
having	a	Living	Wage	clause	as	well	as	clauses	on	trade	union	recognition	and	collective	
bargaining.	This	could	counter	the	growing	problem	of	forced	self-employment	amongst	
construction	workers	which	TASC	recently	identified	(Wickham	and	Bobek	2016).	It	could	
also	address	the	training	deficit	in	Irish	construction	which	has	arisen	partly	as	a	result	of	the	
dependency	of	the	industry	on	short	term	financed	projects.
A	state-led	approach	can	also	ensure	the	increased	quality	and	standards	of	building	(see	Priory	
Hall)	and	the	better	planning	of	estates	and	apartment	blocks	as	places	that	provide	high	quality,	
safe	and	sustainable	homes	and	communities	for	individuals	and	families	of	all	types	and	age	
range.	A	state-led	housing	body	could	also	address	the	regeneration	of	neglected	areas	affected	
by	social	disadvantage	and	provide	local	community	employment.	Housing	alone	is	insufficient	
to	provide	a	home	as	community	facilities,	jobs	and	social	infrastructure	and	supports	
(particularly	in	disadvantaged	areas)	are	all	also	required	(Hearne	2011).
Another	important	aspect	to	an	alternative	approach	to	housing	is	improving	the	quality	and	
security	of	the	private	rental	sector.	Existing	regulations	need	to	be	properly	enforced.	Measures	
that	regulate	rents	(linking	rent	increases	to	inflation	and/or	affordability	and	quality	indexes)	
can	ensure	rents	are	affordable	for	tenants	and	improve	security	of	tenure	for	tenants.	Tenants’	
rights	and	the	affordability	of	housing	as	a	home	rather	than	investors’	and	landlords’	short-term	
profits	should	be	the	policy	priority	for	this	sector.	A	properly	regulated	private	sector	would	
allow	landlords	a	reasonable	return	on	their	investment	in	a	system	in	which	private	rental	is	a	
housing	choice	rather	than	housing	of	last	resort.
European cost-rental housing
Examples	of	more	human	rights	and	equality	oriented	housing	systems	exist	in	other	European	
countries	where	the	state	(either	directly	or	through	not-for-profit	housing	companies)	provides	
much	higher	levels	of	public	affordable	housing	than	is	the	case	in	Ireland.	Table 3.16	shows	
that	while	just	9%	(or	12%	housing	associations	are	included)	of	Ireland’s	housing	stock	is	public	
social	housing,	England	has	17%	of	its	stock	as	social	housing,	22%	of	housing	is	public	rental	in	
Austria	(with	social	housing	38%	of	housing	in	Vienna)	and	it	is	22%	in	Denmark.	Denmark	also	
has	an	additional	8%	of	its	housing	in	co-operatives	while	Sweden	has	20%	public	housing	and	
22%	tenant	owned	co-operative	housing.
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Table 3.16 Social housing as percentage of total housing stock, seven European countries
Percentage of Total Stock Percentage of Rental Stock
Netherlands 33 75
Austria 22 56
France 17 44
England 17 49
Finland 16 53
Ireland 9 32
Germany 3 7
Source: NESC (2014: 5)
A	high	level	of	direct	provision	of	social	housing	tends	to	‘smooth’	house	price	fluctuations.	
Chart 3.8	compares	the	instable	‘boom-bust’	cycle	in	house	price	developments	in	Ireland	with	
the	stability	in	a	country	like	Austria	that	has	much	higher	direct	provision	of	social	housing.
Chart 3.8 Annual % change in house prices in Austria and Ireland, 2000-2014
Source Byrne and Norris (2017)
Social	housing	accounted	for	between	28%	and	37%	of	all	housing	built	in	Austria	between	
2000	and	2014.	In	Vienna	social	housing	accounted	for	over	half	of	housing	output	between	
2000	and	2008.	Austria	had	almost	no	decline	in	either	general	or	affordable	housing	supply	
following	the	financial	crisis.
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Chart 3.9 Social housing new builds, Ireland and Austria
Source: Byrne and Norris (2017)
Box 3.8	provides	a	brief	overview	of	how	the	public	cost-rental	housing	model	operates	in	
Denmark.
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Box 3.8 Denmark’s ‘Cost-Rental’ social/public housing model
 > Housing organisations are non-profit organisations and rent must reflect the costs 
of provision.
 > Social/public housing accommodates 1 million people in more than 8,500 estates, 
owned by 550 housing associations 
 > Strong tenant role in management – tenant democracy
 > Financed from borrowing from Danish Housing Investment Bank (funded by Danish 
pension funds) 
 > Subsidies given by the state towards construction and parts of the building loans 
are guaranteed by local authorities. 
 > There is no income test – everybody is entitled to social housing 
 > Promote a good social mix – provides housing for the lowest incomes and broader 
income ranges 
 > The local authority has the right to allocate a quarter of available dwellings to those 
on their housing list 
 > Tenants may receive housing allowances depending on their income. 
 > The rents must cover the costs of repaying the loans and maintaining the building. 
 > Social housing is not seen as stigmatised – it is called ‘public housing’ available for 
everyone
Source: Byrne and Norris (2017), Irish Examiner (2014)
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3.5 Conclusion: an alternative is possible
The	housing	crisis	is	going	to	worsen	significantly	unless	there	is	a	shift	away	from	housing	as	
a	financialised	commodity	towards	the	state	directly	providing	housing	as	a	human	right.	The	
housing	system	in	Ireland	is	chaotic	and	inequitable.	If	housing	policy	continues	to	be	dominated	
by	a	private	market,	financialised	approach,	then	the	housing	crisis	is	going	to	get	much	worse	in	
the	coming	years.	This	will	especially	be	the	case	for	lower	income	and	younger	households,	the	
homeless,	those	in	the	private	rental	sector	and	those	in	mortgage	arrears.
The	housing	and	homelessness	crisis	is	not	an	accident	but	a	price	Irish	governments	have	been	
willing	to	pay	in	order	to	achieve	‘investor	and	market	confidence’	and	recovery	in	the	property	
market.	The	increasingly	neoliberal	orientation	in	housing	policy	in	recent	decades	led	to	the	
crisis	of	2008.	This	combined	with	the	Irish	state’s	strategy	for	recovery	resulted	in	the	post-
2013	housing	crisis	which	is	now	a	social	emergency	with	major	economic	implications.	The	
rising	numbers	of	homeless	families,	those	in	mortgage	arrears	and	others	affected	by	worsening	
housing	affordability	and	insecurity	are	the	inevitable	collateral	damage	of	a	very	specific	
government	policy.
Those	most	affected	by	the	government	strategy	are	those	who	have	been	least	able	to	afford	
it.	They	are	mainly	those	who	are	on	low	and	middle	incomes	who	in	previous	generations	
would	have	obtained	affordable	and	secure	housing,	either	from	the	social	housing	sector	or	
through	support	to	buy	a	home.	These	groups	now	form	a	growing	market	of	‘limitless	demand’	
for	investors	in	the	provision	of	private	rental	housing.
The	weak	manner	in	which	the	government	responded,	from	2013	onwards,	to	rising	rents	
and	homelessness	suggests	a	capture	of	many	policy	makers	by	the	demands	of	global	equity	
funds,	banks	and	the	property	industry.	Housing	affordability	and	security	were	not	prioritised	
and	previous	efforts	to	control	rising	housing	costs	were	abandoned.	For	example,	the	form	of	
rent	regulation	introduced	enabled	on-going	rent	increases	while	the	various	tax	supports	and	
loopholes	that	benefit	real	estate	investment	show	the	strong	influence	and	lobbying	of	global	
property	funds	over	Irish	housing	and	tax	policy.
The	housing	strategy	is	again	dependent	on	the	profit	estimations	and	investment	strategies	of	
private	finance	–	both	Irish	developers	and	increasingly,	large	international	private	equity	funds,	
and	their	decisions	whether	to	sell	or	develop	their	own	land,	invest	in	private	rental	provision	
or	in	developing	local	authority	land.	This	is	a	highly	risky	strategy	that	places	all	the	power	
into	hands	of	the	market	–	the	wealthy	investors	and	developers.	Rebuilding Ireland	does	not	
prioritise	the	provision	of	housing	as	a	human	right	and	a	social	need	–	it	does	not	even	mention	
the	human	right	to	housing	once.
Ireland’s	latest	property	boom	is	even	more	unsustainable	and	dangerous	than	the	previous	
boom	that	destroyed	the	economy	and	the	lives	of	many.	The	new	boom	is	largely	based	on	
speculative	international	investment.	It	is	also	being	fuelled	by	the	re-promotion	(through	the	
help-to-buy	scheme)	of	the	dream	of	home-ownership	to	the	lower	and	middle	classes	for	
whom	it	has	become	increasingly	unaffordable	and	inaccessible.
The	property	industry	complex	–	the	state,	government,	banks,	media,	legal	and	property	
professions	are	erasing	the	memories	of	the	recent	housing	catastrophe,	in	particular	of	
widespread	mortgage	arrears	and	homelessness.	They	are	trying	to	re-articulate	the	neoliberal	
ideal	of	mortgaged	home-ownership	as	the	way	in	which	the	middle	class	in	particular	can	
secure	a	home	and	get	their	foot	on	the	‘property	ladder’.	This	is	ultimately	about	fuelling	private	
housing	demand	to	push	prices	higher	and	make	house	building	increasingly	profitable	for	all	
the	interests	who	rely	on	the	property	chain.	However,	the	reality	of	inequalities	within	the	
housing	and	labour	market	today	mean	that	increasing	numbers	of	the	working	and	middle	class	
are	being	excluded	from	affordable	home-ownership.	Furthermore,	the	reliance	on	rising	house	
prices	as	a	key	factor	for	economic	growth	through	increased	consumption	is	also	unsustainable	
economically	and	ecologically.
The	housing	and	
homelessness	
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The	failure	to	learn	from	past	mistakes	suggests	a	system	that	is	beholden	to	an	impotent	
ideology	and	to	wealthy	and	propertied	interests.	By	contrast,	countries	with	more	successful	
and	affordable	housing	models	such	as	Denmark	and	Austria	show	that	it	is	only	the	state	that	
can	guarantee	the	supply	of	affordable	housing	and	homes.	The	type	of	policies	outlined	above	
have	been	proposed	by	many	others	over	the	last	decade	(Drudy	and	Punch	2005;	Hearne	
2011	and	2014;	NERI	2017;	NESC	2014).	The	issue	is	not	the	lack	of	alternative	policies.	
The	problem	is	not	the	lack	of	political	will	to	implement	transformative	policies,	since	current	
policies	are	in	fact	profoundly	transformative	by	commodifying	and	financialising	housing	more	
deeply	than	ever	before.	The	problem	is	the	absence	of	a	political	interest	in	pursuing	policies	
that	prioritise	the	provision	of	affordable	and	secure	housing	to	meet	people’s	housing	needs.
The	housing	crisis	is	not	an	isolated	social	crisis	but	stems	from	and	is	linked	to	the	failures	of	
the	Irish	economic	model.	As	documented	in	TASC’s	Cherishing	All	Equally	reports,	Ireland’s	
social	and	political	institutions	are	committed	to	solidifying	the	private	for-profit	market,	to	
low	taxation	and	to	low	public	expenditure	policies.	The	human	rights	and	equality	approach	
to	housing	outlined	in	this	chapter	as	an	alternative	policy	direction	could	ameliorate	growing	
economic	inequality	and	weaken	mechanisms	that	generate	inequality	within	the	housing	and	
financial	sphere.	Housing	could	become	a	key	factor	in	protecting	people	from	rising	levels	of	
market	generated	inequality	and	a	key	mechanism	to	reduce	levels	of	economic	inequality,	while	
making	an	important	contribution	to	Ireland’s	economy	and	job	creation.
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